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Abstract

icy and planning algorithm scale well as more
agents are added to the system.

We propose a method for increasing incentives for sites to host arbitrary mobile agents
in which mobile agents purchase their computing needs from host sites. We present a
scalable market-based CPU allocation policy
and an on-line algorithm that plans a mobile
agent's expenditure over a multihop ordered
itinerary. The algorithm chooses a set of sites
at which to execute and computational priorities at each site to minimize execution time
while preserving a prespeci ed budget constraint. We present simulation results of our
algorithm to show that our allocation pol-

1

Introduction

A mobile-agent system provides an environment that allows user programs (mobile
agents) to voluntarily relocate and resume execution at another host site. Mobility is especially useful in reducing network latency
and in operating in disconnected environments [LO98]. These qualities make mobility
an attractive option for isolated applications
and closed administrative domains, but the
1
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Given the importance of the number of
sites, we would like to encourage site owners
to open up access to their resources to the
entire community of mobile-agent users. The
resources used by mobile agents are general
and often diÆcult to analyze. Not only do
hosts sacri ce access to their own resources,
but there are security risks inherent to providing any additional network service.

application of the technique has much greater
potential. An important issue is providing
hosts incentive to o er service for arbitrary
mobile agents.
There are several techniques to protect
host sites from visiting agents [Moo98], but
hosts will always su er from higher loads
induced by visiting agents. To mitigate
this problem we investigate the possibility of
agents compensating host sites by purchasing
computational resources from hosts [Tsc97,
BKR98]. Resources include, but are not limited to, processor time, storage, and network
access, as well as abstract value-added services.
In this paper, the resource on which we focus is CPU priority which we use to approximate general computational priority among
agents. We present a lottery-based CPU
scheduling policy and planning algorithms to
allow mobile agents to plan expenditure of
multi-hop itineraries. We describe a simulation system for these algorithms. Our experiments show that our algorithms allow agents
to complete lengthy trips with high con dence in environments with bursty resource
contention. Additionally, we show that our
lottery-based allocation policy scales well as
the number of agents in the system increases.
The value of a mobile-agent system is dependent on both the number of host sites
that an agent may migrate to as well as the
number of other agents with which an agent
may interact. Conventional wisdom is that
the value of a network increases quadratically
with the number of users and sites that have
access to it. We believe this also holds true
for a mobile-agent system.

We propose that hosts be compensated for
these factors through agents using a scarce
veri able electronic currency to purchases all
their computational and information needs.
We see several bene ts of mobile agents participating in markets to access their computational needs. Markets limit the extent of
agents' impact, provide simple a means of
agent coordination through prices, and facilitate exible administrative domains.
Because currency is scarce, agents' activities are limited. The extent of denial-ofservice attacks are limited and, assuming that
prices are eÆcient, a host would actually bene t from such an \attack," though an offender would not be able to carry out such
an action for long.
In market systems, there is generally
a strong correlation between demand and
higher prices. By providing agents with the
price of services, they become aware of their
environmental impact. We would like to use
this e ect to give mobile agents incentive to
avoid congesting a site. A possible solution
for agents crowding a site is to either wait
until a more appropriate time to execute or
choose a less congested site.
2

2 An Allocation Policy

parts the server, the server searches for a
ticket circulation where each agent is content
with the value and size of its share, a Nash
equilibrium, and reallocates the new circulation according to agents' bidding functions.
Because agents cannot purchase negative
number of shares, the bid functions are not
convex. Thus a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily guaranteed to exist. We nd that
in practice, using a bisection search, we can
nd an -Nash equilibrium, where participants wish to change their bids by only a
small amount.

To encourage agents to act rationally, a reasonable price mechanism must be in use.
In this section we explore an instance of a
pricing mechanism where owners of prioritybased resources (CPU's) lease shares, or tickets, for access. The quality of service a ticket
holder receives is proportional to the number
of tickets held relative to the number of tickets in circulation, creating a modi ed lottery
or round-robin scheduling system.
The resource owner can x the price of leasing tickets and let the number of tickets in circulation oat; the real price of computation
is determined by the number of tickets held
by agents. Two major bene ts of this pricing
scheme are that the computational responsibilities of the price mechanism are distributed
among the users and it is easy to implement.
Many traditional priority-based computational resources are allocated using priority queues or priority strati ed round-robin
schedulers. These systems rely on users having heterogeneous preferences to stratify priorities. Such schemes do not scale well as
user preferences become more diverse, however. After the third or fourth priority
level, no real service is left to allocate among
users [GSW97, BKR98].
Our allocation policy asks each agent to
submit a linear function describing the number of tickets each agent would buy given the
number of shares held by competing agents.
We restrict the function to be linear and decreasing.1 Each time an agent arrives or de1 Section

3 The Model
The model that we examine is one where each
agent is given a xed endowment of currency
and an ordered set of tasks to complete. Each
task may be executed at one of several sites
of varying capacity. Agents must choose a
set of sites to visit and the quality of service desired at each site. The goal is to minimize time of execution while preserving budget constraints.
3.1

Lottery Allocation

At each site they visit, agents decide to rent
some number of tickets at a xed price per
second. Tickets represent relative computing
priority. The agent can then consume a computing share proportional to its ownership of
lottery tickets relative to the total number in
circulation.

3.2.1 justi es restricting bid functions in this way.
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tage to buy an extra amount of tickets to increase performance at the collaborators' expense. Axelrod [Axe84] nds agents are less
likely to cooperate if they are anonymous or
expect little future interaction, so our lottery
scheduling works better as the number of participating agents increases. In addition, the
host system has incentive to protect the identity of visiting clients.

Inform
User

Figure 1: An example of an agent's itinerary.
At each hop of the schedule, there may 3.2 Utility Maximization
be multiple host sites willing to accept the
We need a metric for quality of service on
agent's task.
which to derive users' utility. Frequently,
quality of service is indicated by end-to-end
Using this style of resource allocation, it latency of the task or by rate of computais possible to describe the load of a host tion. The accuracy or precision of the process
system with just a few parameters: ticket is important in some cases, for example in a
circulation and a performance metric of the database query. The work in this paper only
host. Visiting agents do not need to disclose considers utility to be a function of the rate
any information to participate in the mar- at which an agent computes. We assume that
ket, other than the quantity of tickets desired an agent has K tasks to complete and each
to be purchased. The accuracy of a host's task may be completed at one of any number
published parameters can be tested through of comparable host sites.
benchmarking an agent's performance.
We wish to maximize the expected perThe strategy of how an agent would par- formance of all tasks in an agent's itinerary.
ticipate in a computational lottery market ck ; Mk ; and nk represent the capacity in inresembles the Prisoner's Dilemma [Axe84]. structions per second, ticket circulation, and
Agents can buy large quantities of tickets, the agent's ticket holdings at the site where
P qk , is
the analog of defection or confessing to the the kth task is executed. Q = K
k=1
police. Alternatively they may attempt to re- the total quantity of computation in instrucceive better performance by all buying small tions to be done. We now compute an agent's
amounts of tickets, which is the analog of co- expected rate of computation in Equation 1.
operating.
The numerator is the sum of all job sizes and
While agents may collaborate to form a the denominator is the expected completion
cartel by agreeing to buy no more than a time, the quotient of the kth job size and
given amount of tickets (one each) from a expected rate of computation. The rate of
server, it is frequently to an agent's advan- computation is just the agent's ticket share,
4

nk ,

relative to the total circulation, nk + Mk ,
weighted by the processing capacity of the
host, ck :
U

= K
P

Q

E

hq

n M
nc

k( k +

k)

i

4. The network of hosts is at or near equilibrium.
5. The capacity, ticket price, and current
ticket circulations of all hosts are available to agents.

(1)

k=1
We must also formalize the budget constraint. I represents the agent's initial budget endowment constraining the the sum of
the amounts spent at each site, pk nk tk , where
tk = qk (nk + Mk )=ck nk denotes the time spent
at the kth site, the quantity of the job size divided by the rate of computation. pk is the
price of renting a ticket at the kth host for
a xed time unit. Substituting the value of
tk into the product pk nk tk and taking the expected value, we derive the budget constraint
to be:

We will later relax Assumptions 2, 3, and 4.
When Assumption 2 is dropped, the problem of choosing the optimal expected path
is NP-complete if the agent has the estimated costs and execution times at each
host. We note that the problem is the constrained shortest path problem [AMO93] and
show a transformation presented by Ahuja
et al [AMO93] from the knapsack problem [GJ79] to our problem. The constrained
shortest path problem (CSP) is given a directed graph whose edges have associated
costs and lengths, a path length, l, and a cost
constraint, c, to nd a path of at connecting
two points where the sum of the path's edge
cost is at most a c and the sum of the path's
edge lengths is at most l.
The problem is in NP; a solution can be
veri ed in linear time by summing the costs
and lengths of all edges in the solution. We
can express any knapsack problem in terms of
CSP by creating a lattice graph in Figure 2.
The graph is divided into three levels. The
nodes in the top level, labeled i0 , represent
the choice of placing the ith object in the
knapsack. The nodes in the bottom level,
labeled i00 , represent the choice of excluding
the ith object. The edge from i to i0 has
cost equal to the weight or volume, wi , of the
ith object, and distance equal to the negative
value, vi , of the ith object. All other edges
have zero cost and distance.

k k

K pk qk (nk + E[Mk ])
X
0

(2)
ck
k=1
To solve the problem of how many shares
an agent should buy, we initially make some
assumptions:
I

1. Once an agent chooses a site, it may not
choose another until its current task is
completed.
2. Each portion of the itinerary has only
one site alternative.
3. The size of each agent's task is small
compared to the sum of the sizes of the
other tasks currently executing at any
host site.
5

contention based upon current conditions.
Assumption 4 implies that the load of every
1
2
3
.... n
n+1
host in the network is approximately equal
to the current host's load relative to price
1’’
2’’
n’’
and capacity. The agent observes that the
rst site's ticket circulation is m1 . We set
Figure 2: A reduction of the knapsack prob- M = m and weight hosts' loads according
1
1
lem to the constrained shortest path problem. to capacity and price yielding:
1’

(-v1,w1)

2’

(-v2,w2)

n’’

(-vn,wn)

(p1 =c1 )
m
(3)
(pk =ck ) 1
The use of the estimator in Equation 3 makes
sense if there is a reasonable ow of agents requesting service. Incoming agents will choose
to hold ticket leases with the highest value.
Once a site becomes crowded, the value of
each additional ticket sold drops, new agents
will choose to execute at sites with higher
ticket values, and the local population growth
will slow.
Using the Lagrange function [Lan87],
Equation 4, we minimize the denominator of
Equation 1, t(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 ), under the budget constraint, Equation 2.

Since any knapsack problem can be expressed as a CSP problem and CSP is in NP,
CSP is NP-complete. We use Assumption 2
to create an estimator for the general case in
Section 3.2.2.
Assumption 3 allows us to reason about the
actions of a single agent without attempting to second guess the rest of the market.
Agents construct a purchasing policy, or bidding function, based upon the assumption.
The bidding functions are then submitted to
the service providers who attempt to nd a
resource allocation that satis es every agent's
bid function.
Our next task is to derive agents' purchasing policy that will minimize agents' execution time. A purchasing policy must account
for estimating the random variables, Mk 's, in
Equations 2 and 1, the topic of the next subsection.
3.2.1

E[Mk ] =

L(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 )

= t(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 )
(I
e(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 ))
(4)
Where t(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 ); the denominator of
Equation 1, and e(n1 ; : : : nK ; m1 ); the budget constraint from Equation 2, denote the
expected amount of time an agent takes to
perform its itinerary and the expected expenditure completing it, respectively, given the
ticket share purchases at each site and the
ticket circulation at the rst host site. The
resulting solution gives a ratio for the share

A Simple Estimator

EÆcient expenditure planning must forecast
future network conditions. In our problem, agents are concerned with the congestion of resources represented by the size of
hosts' ticket circulations. We now describe a
method for agents to estimate future resource
6

of computation at any two hosts:

v
u
u p =c
nk
=t i i
ni

ticket share given their competitors' holdings.
Let there be L agents at the site and each lth
agent submits parameters

(5)

pk =ck

K
p1 P
c1 k=1 qk
al =
PK qk q p1p
c1 c
k=1

Using Equation 5 with the budget constraint, we obtain the optimal share to purchase at the rst site:

(8)
k

k

K
m1 p1 P
c1 k=1 qk
n1 =
(6)
PK qk q p1p
c1 c
k=1
If the agent assumes that the current load
of future sites is equal to the future load, however, the optimal number of tickets to buy at
the rst site is:

and

bl

I

= K
P

I

qp p
q

(9)

k cc
k=1
to describe each client's linear bidding function. al and bl are the coeÆcients of n1
in Equation 6. We omit subscripting of all
the parameters on the right-hand side of the
Equations 8 and 9 with l to avoid clutter.
We can calculate the number of shares that
K pqm
P
clients buy as an iterated process. At the
I
c
k
=1
n1 =
(7) ith iteration, the lth client buys a number of
PK qk q p1p
shares speci ed by the bidding function pac1 c
k=1
rameters and the number of competing shares
Assumptions 3 and 4 imply that a newly at the previous iteration, mi 1 nl 1 to yield:
arriving agent's request for computing lottery
tickets will not e ect the competition very
nl = max(0; al (mi 1
nl 1 ) + bl )
(10)
much. That is, agents already present will
not signi cantly change their ticket holdings
The total number of tickets sold at the ith
in response to one more agent arriving.
iteration is then:
In order for a host to obtain a solution in
which all agents are content with their ticket
L
X
holdings, a host must repeatedly query agents
for their purchases given the result of the last mi = max(0; al (mi 1 nl 1 ) + bl ) (11)
l=1
iteration. Each iteration drives ticket holdings towards a Nash equilibrium. Note that The max() function restricts agents to buying
Equation 6 is linear with respect to m1 . On a non-negative number of shares.
We cannot analytically solve Equations 11
this note, we would like to analytically compute a xed point solution where all agents and 10, but if we ignore the fact that the
present at the host site will hold a stable al (mi 1 nl 1 ) terms may be negative, set
k

1
1

k

k

k

k k

k

k

k

k

i

i

i

i

i
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each nl = nl 1 and mi = mi 1 , and solve, we
get a good start on the search process for a
ticket share equilibrium. Every time an agent
arrives or leaves a site, the server runs a binary search shown in Figure 3.2.1 to set the
circulation. The search process runs until the
ticket circulation oscillates within a set tolerance, , or exceeds a set number of iterations,
limit.
i

3.2.2

i

We would like to expand our planning mechanism to include information about more than
one host site per task. To handle site choice,
we augment Equation 6 slightly. We assume
that agents can observe ticket circulations at
prospective hosts for the next task to be completed. For later tasks, we use the means of
the prices and capacities of sites in each service group.
Agents then choose host sites by constructing an estimate of expected completion time
for itineraries beginining at each prospective
host using the averaged prices and capacities
for prospective hosts of the second and later
tasks. Again, agents assume that the reaction of other agents already at the prospective hosts will be neglibible. The host site
with the lowest estimated completion time is
then chosen.
For example, an agent may have two tasks.
There are two sites able to accept the rst
task and two more sites able to accept the
second. The second pair of sites have capacities 2.0 and 2.5, ticket circulations 5.2
and 7.0, and ticket prices 1.0 and 1.5, respectively. The agent uses Equation 6 twice, setting c2 = 2:25 and p2 = 1:25, to determine
the rate of compuation if the agent were to
begin its itinerary at either of the rst pair
of sites. In the calculations, m1 is set to the
value of the current ticket circulations of each
of the rst pair of hosts. The agent then
chooses the faster of the rst pair of hosts.
We simulate strategies using both the future site averaging and the reaction estimate
assumptions in the next section.

ServerAllocate

1

m

Considering Site Alternatives

Solving xed point of
Equations 11 and 10

2 lastm m
3 i 0
4 do
5
lastm
(m + lastm)=2
6
m
0
7
foreach client l do
8
m += al  lastm + bl
9
i++
10 while ((jm lastmj >  or i < 2)
11 and (i < limit or m < 0))
Figure 3: The processor allocation algorithm
used by servers.
We assume that host sites are able to augment q1 for each agent. It may be the case
that the series, m1 ; m2 ; m3 ; : : :, does not converge to a positive value. Experimentally,
though, we nd that the series converges
more than 99% of the time, most of the time
in fewer than ten iterations. When the series
does not converge within limit iterations, we
choose the last positive ticket circulation encountered in the search.
8

4 Simulation

second argument for executing the task represented by the third argument.  is the smallest number of shares that hosts will lease to
an agent. Once the agent chooses the site, the
agent bids for the smallest amount of shares
possible until the job completes.

We wish to see how our strategies perform
in planning resource expenditure. To do so,
we simulate a network with a xed number
of servers using the DaSSF simulation package [NL99]. The servers are partitioned by
the service that they provide. Our simulations represent a network of eight services
each provided by eight hosts resulting in a
network with 64 host sites. Host site capacity is normally distributed to make site choice
more meaningful.
Agents in the system are created at a Poisson arrival rate with exponentially sized jobs
(qk ) comprising itineraries whose length (K )
are exponentially distributed. Endowments
(I ) are the product of a normally distributed
random
P variable and the agents' job sizes
(Q = qk ).
Agents choose a site based upon the congestion of the network, represented by site
ticket circulation. Once the agent chooses
the site, it commits to attempting to complete the current task at the chosen site.
We now present several strategies that
agents can use to choose sites and bid. Several are simple baseline comparisons.

CHEAP

1 foreach task i
2
qmax
;
3
foreach possible site j
4
if cheaperTask (qmax ; j; i)
5
qmax
j
6 jumpTo qmax leasing  shares
Figure 4: The CHEAP planning algorithm.
With little competition, budget expenditure is a weak constraint and one would expect this algorithm to complete jobs with a
high degree of certainty.
4.2

Random

As another comparison, we have implemented a strategy we call RAND which is
shown in Figure 4.2. Each site o ering a
given service has an equal chance of being
chosen by the algorithm. Once a site has been
4.1
Cheapest Available
chosen, the algorithm uniformly chooses beOur rst comparison algorithm, CHEAP tween zero and 90 percent, non-inclusive, of
shown in Figure 4.1, chooses the site which the budget to spend at the current site.
will complete the next task with the lowest estimated expenditure. The predicate 4.3 Equilibrium Assumption
cheaperTask returns true if the site represented by the rst argument requires lower We implement a strategy from Equation 6 to
expenditures than the site represented by the choose sites and bid for shares. We nd that
9

RAND

EQ

1 foreach task i
2
host
uniform fhosts o ering ig
3
jumpTo host
spending (uniform (0; 0:9I ))

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Figure 5: The RAND planning algorithm.
frequently agents using this strategy bid too
aggressively. That is, agents buy too many
shares early in their itineraries to allow reasonably fast completion of later tasks. To account for the strategy's myopia, we multiply
agents' job size estimates by a constant factor
for purposes of bidding. Figure 6 shows the
results of our empirical search for a good bias
factor. In the experiment, all agents use the
same job size bias factor and agents arrive at
a rate so that system utilization is half the
system capacity. Empirically, we nd that
2.2 is a good bias factor.
observed
linear fit

1

Itinerary Completion
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foreach

q
foreach

qmax

task q 2 Q
q

 bias

task i

;
1

tmin

foreach

t
if

possible site j

tripTime
buying Eqn 6 shares

t < tmin
qmax

j

jumpTo qmax withBidFunc Eqn 6

Figure 7: The EQ planning algorithm.
4.4

Complete Knowledge

The next strategy, COMP, is exactly like the
previous, except that the current load of all
servers to be used later in the itinerary is
known at the time agents choose a site and
bid for tickets. As with prices and capacities,
measures of load for future sites is averaged
over all sites o ering the same service. This
strategy is less sensitive than the EQ strategy to uctuating loads, so we do not bias job
size. The bidding function for each agent is
Equation 7.
We augment the EQ algorithm with the
bidding function in Equation 7 to yield the
algorithm shown in Figure 4.4, the COMP
planning algorithm.

3

Job Size Bias Factor

4.5

Simulation Results

Figure 6: Success rate of agents using the EQ
algorithm versus the job size bias factor.
We investigate two general classes of environments: one where all participating agents
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COMP

6
7
8

qmax

task i

;
1

tmin

foreach

t
if

2.5

possible site j

tripTime
buying Eqn 7 shares

t < tmin
qmax

observation
linear fit

3

Performance Rate

foreach

2
1.5
1

j

0.5

jumpTo qmax withBidFunc Eqn 7

0
0

2
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8
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Endowment Relative to Job Size

14
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18

Figure 9: Agent endowment relative to job
size versus performance with 2 t.

Figure 8: The COMP planning algorithm.
use the same bidding strategy, and one where
each agent uses a randomly chosen strategy.
We would rst like to verify that agents
that pay more receive better service than
agents who pay less. Figure 9 shows observations of the amount that agents using the
EQ strategy spend relative to the size of their
jobs versus the performance that they receive.
We also plot a 2 linear t of the data. The
graph con rms that agents' expected performance is dependent to expenditure.
Figure 10 shows the rate at which agents
complete their itineraries compared to the job
arrival intensity rate. The rate of 6.4 jobs per
time unit is the system's maximum capacity.
Agents using the EQ strategy complete their
itineraries over 97 percent of the time until
system utilization exceeds 85 percent of capacity. COMP performs marginally better.
Agents using the CHEAP strategy always
complete their task. We omit plotting the
outcome. The strategy's success is due to the
fact that budgets dwarf expenditure. Agents

1.1

COMP
EQ
RAND

1
0.9
Itinerary Success Rate

1
2
3
4
5

3.5

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
1

2

3

4

5

6

Arrival Intensity

Figure 10: Itinerary success rate when all
agents use a single strategy.
using the CHEAP strategy cooperate to keep
the e ective price of computation to negligible levels and e ectively eliminate budget
constraints. All agents receive equal computational priority, however, and there is little
reason to enforce a market system if all participating agents use the CHEAP strategy.
Figure 11 shows the mean performance
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Figure 11: Average computational rate for Figure 12: Success rates of a agents in a scecompleted itineraries when all agents use a nario where each strategy is used by one quarsingle strategy.
ter of the population.
rates of agents using various strategies, again
where all agents in the scenario have the identical strategies. The mean host site capacity
is 2.0, but in light loads, agents are able to
nd access to faster hosts and raise the mean
rate of computation above the mean host capacity.
Again, the EQ and COMP strategies have
similar results. The RAND strategy does not
perform nearly as well as EQ and COMP
since choosing host sites randomly tends to
result in pockets of moderate congestion. Additionally, the wide spread in bids leads to
performance disparities that lower the mean
computation rate.
Agents using the CHEAP strategy have
dismal performance; they always pick the
cheapest service provider regardless of the
performance. The result is that a few
providers handle much of the load and the
more expensive ones are left empty.

Finally, we are interested in how the different strategies compete against each other.
In our next simulation, when an agent is created, it is assigned one of the four strategies
uniformly.
Figure 12 shows the itinerary completion
success of the four strategies competing in a
common environment. The strategies, with
the exception of CHEAP, perform similarly
as they do in homogeneous environments.
The CHEAP strategy's success is a ected by
the other strategies crowding the agents using CHEAP. Once the ticket circulation rises
above a certain level, it becomes impossible
for a CHEAP agent to complete its task.
Figure 13 shows the mean rate that agents
compute their tasks in job units per time
unit. Again, the results are similar to those
in the homogeneous environments.
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Figure 13: Average rate of computation for
completing agents in an environment where
each strategy is used by one quarter of the
population.

5 Discussion
Both EQ and COMP strategies perform well.
Good performance is evident in Figures 11
and 13. While the network load is under half
capacity, the majority of agents are able to
achieve service better than the average host
can provide.
Since the level of service degrades gradually with increasing arrival intensities, we believe that our lottery allocation policy scales
nicely and that the EQ and COMP strategies
will work well in many environments.
In our experiments, complete knowledge of
the network state does not give agents significant gains in performance. In part, this is
because loads of servers across services are
correlated. If the loads were uncorrelated
(or perhaps even negatively correlated), the
equilibrium assumption used in the EQ strat-

egy would hinder agents' performance, while
agents using complete knowledge would be
less e ected.
The equilibrium assumption, however,
does have one bene t when shares are updated: it is not necessary to obtain the loads
of all servers in the network. This feature is
especially important if the network is disconnected as in the case of many mobile-agent
applications.
Another bene t of using the EQ and
COMP strategies is their simplicity. Much
of the EQ and COMP algorithms' simplicity
is is due to the fact that the agents do not
attempt to preserve savings; they attempt to
spend all of their funds on computation. This
behavior justi es the use of a linear bid function.
If savings were an issue, however, linear
functions would not suÆce. Agents would
then desire to bid small amounts in situations
with little congestion as well when resource
contention is high. Agents would bid most
under moderate resource contention. Dispensing agents' need to save facilitates equilibrium nding and avoids the problem of
measuring the value of savings versus faster
execution.
5.1

Structure

In running many simulations and devising
bidding algorithms we have noticed a few
properties of our lottery-based resource allocation system. Information regarding the distribution of ticket circulation at host sites certainly e ects planning decisions on the part
of agents. We observe that the distribution of
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ticket sales at sites is roughly Gaussian. Figure 14 shows histograms of ticket frequencies
at two di erent sites with 50 percent load.
Each histogram is generated by collecting the
ticket circulation whenever an agent arrives
or departs a site.
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Figure 14: Histogram of ticket circulation at
two sites over a run with a relative load of
50% and Gaussian distributions with the corresponding mean and variances.
We believe that this distribution is heavily
dependent on the distribution of the sum of
agents' endowments relative to their job sizes
(also Gaussian). We believe that the distribution of wealth at sites is valuable knowledge for expenditure planning and our future
expenditure planning algorithms will use the
distribution to estimate resource congestion.
The distribution of ticket sales at sites will
become important if we wish to consider the
possibility of allowing agents to restart or
continue their un nished current execution at
another site. Agents could estimate their expected time savings given the time taken to

jump across the network (a feature we do not
yet model) and the mean and variances of
other sites' tickets sales.
We now turn our attention to general properties of our system at equilibrium. Specifically, we are interested in the relationship
between price of tickets and congestion, the
ticket circulation relative to system capacity.
At equilibrium, the relationship of price to
congestion is strictly decreasing. The argument is simple: agents will choose cheaper
service from faster hosts over more expensive
service from slower hosts.
Currently, we do not model agents' ability to split the execution of one task across
multiple servers. Breaking up computation is
not unreasonable if the mobile-agent system
supports a transparent jump command, like
D'Agents' agent jump command. An agent
can execute a portion of its task at one server
and then relocate to another host to continue
the rest of the task. The resulting performance is a weighted average of the two sites
with an amount of overhead to account for
relocating the agent.
If we allow splitting of tasks, then we may
make further assumptions on the relationship between price and congestion; at equilibrium the relationship may not be concave
downward. Breaking up the execution allows agents to use portfolio strategy to blend
performance of multiple sites to achieve a
weighted average of site performance. Hence
if the relationship becomes concave downward, agents will prefer splitting their execution between sites cheap congested sites and
expensive fast sites rather than jump to sites
less extremely characterized sites. The argu-
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ment is illustrated in Figure 15.

A

B
C
Price

Figure 15: Relative congestion as a function
of ticket price at equilibrium may not be concave downward if agents' jobs can be broken
up to be executed at multiple sites. If the
function is concave downward as represented
here, agents will choose to execute parts of
their jobs at A and C until the weighted performance of such a portfolio becomes at least
as congested as the performance at site B.
One nal note on price concavity: if
agents use mean metrics for planning expenditure as done in Section 3.2.2 and the
price-congestion relationship is concave up,
the price-congestion pair representing the average of several hosts will provide a conservative estimator.

6 Related Work
Waldspurger [WW94] uses lotteries as a resource allocation model to manage computational resources such as network bandwidth,
processor time, and memory. Two major differences between standard lotteries and ours

is that tickets are leased, not bought, and
are consumed only when the lease expires.
Scheduling can be done in a simple roundrobin time slicing manner.
An implementation a lottery market-based
system is in the Geneva Messengers [Tsc97]
mobile-agent system where a currency system
is used to allocate CPU time as well as memory for mobile agents. Processing resources
are allocated through agents buying tickets.
At each quantum, a ticket is chosen and the
owning agent is given access to the CPU for
the quantum. One feature of lotteries implemented in this way, is that the while the
price of computational priority may uctuate, the price of a quantum of CPU time is
xed, facilitating budget planning. Pricing in
this manner does not enforce a positive correlation between the demand and the price of a
scarce resource, however, giving agents little
incentive to balance network load.
Memory in the Messengers system is also
allocated using a currency system. Agents
\sponsor" persistent blocks of memory. A
block of data is endowed with currency by
interested parties (readers). Periodically, the
sponsored blocks' accounts are charged and
blocks having depleted accounts are ushed
from the system. The rate at which blocks
are charged varies over time depending on the
contention for additional block space.
While Messengers has market resource allocation mechanisms, the system presents no
means for expenditure planning on the part
of agents.
Moizumi [Moi98] attacks similar mobileagent problems. He derives a general procedure for mobile agents to plan an itinerary
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visiting a known set of hosts using dynamic
programming is presented. Much of the work
is based on NP-completeness work through
reduction to the Traveling Salesman Problem
and approximation solutions. Our work takes
a di erent slant; we assume that the basic sequence of computation is predetermined and
that re nements of location and priority decisions are made along agents' travels.
In our investigations concerning the applicability of our system to load balancing, it is
certainly worth mentioning that it has been
shown that heterogeneity of preferences can
improve load balancing substantially by encouraging adaptive systems to further explore
the parameter space than agents in a homogeneous populations [SST95].

cution time while preserving a xed budget
constraint.

7 Summary
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We believe that mobility would be of far
greater use to software developers if a larger
number of host sites would be willing to host
arbitrary agents. There is little reason for
sites to accept foreign mobile agents, however. To remedy this shortfall, we propose
that agents purchase the resources that they
consume from hosts.
We present a market-based CPU priorityallocation policy and simple algorithms that
allow mobile agents to plan multi-hop trips
through a network of host systems providing various services. The algorithms that we
present produce both a route through the
network and the desired computational priority to be received at each site on the route.
The constructed plans minimize agent exe-

Our simulations show that the algorithms
scale smoothly. Evidence of our algorithms'
e ectiveness is that we are frequently able to
plan routes through a network with performance greater than the average host is capable of providing and that we are able to complete agent itineraries with empirically high
con dence.
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